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    资本预算方法问题

    • 资料级别:普通资料
    • 资料大小:353 KB
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    • 上传时间:2006-4-24 12:55:00
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    资料简介:Abstract
    I argue that the mainstream approach to capital budgeting focuses excessively on the special case
    where diversifiable risks do not affect the contribution of a project to the value of the firm. This
    approach ignores the impact of a new project on a firm’s total risk and therefore often leads to an
    inappropriate assessment of the value of the project. I present arguments for why total risk is often
    costly and discuss how taking total risk into account in capital budgeting is necessary to make capital
    budgeting and capital structure decisions consistent.
    Every MBA knows at the end of her studies how to value a project. She will have been taught
    that a project increases shareholder wealth if the net present value of that project is positive. To
    compute that net present value, she has to forecast the cash flows of the project and discount them
    at a discount rate that reflects the price charged by the capital markets for the risk of the cash flows.
    In computing the net present value of the project, the MBA student is told repeatedly that the
    volatility of the project’s cash flows in no way affects its value. Comparing two projects that have the
    same expected cash flows, the project with more volatile cash flows can be more or less valuable than
    the project with the less volatile cash flows. Furthermore, the student will be told that it does not
    matter how the cash flows of the project are correlated with the cash flows of the firm because the
    firm’s total risk does not affect its value. As a result of these arguments, the discount rate depends
    only on the project’s risk as measured by the capital markets. Hence, unless there are synergies
    between the project and the existing investments of the firm, the project’s value is the same
    irrespective of the firm that undertakes it.
    The way capital budgeting istaught and practiced presents a huge paradox. Much of the
    academic research in corporate finance of the last twenty-five years has focused on emphasizing the
    implications for capital structure and investment decisions of real life impediments to contracting such
    as the impossibility of writing contracts that specify every contingency and the existence of important
    information asymmetries between managers and investors that hinder firms’ ability to raise funds.
    Paradoxically, however, if these developments have an impact when it comes to the teaching capital
    budgeting or when firms implement capital budgeting as their managers were told to do in business
    schools, it is almost as an afterthought. Modern corporate finance started with the Modigliani-Millerpropositions.